The Language of Survival: Singapore's Total Fertility Rate

I Fear It Is Urgent: Crisis Framing in Singapore’s TFR Discourse

A defining characteristic of Singapore’s TFR discourse is its persistent tone of urgency, where it frequently crosses into crisis-framing to justify state intervention. In 1960, before the falling birthrate, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health, Dr Sheng Nam Chin, emphasised the urgent need for family planning in Singapore. He stated that the cause of overpopulation could be a reflection of Singapore’s prosperity, but its effects were becoming a heavy burden to the state. The worry at the time was the potential reallocation of resources for the government’s industrialisation programme to the provision of health, education and welfare services to support the increased population count. Industrialisation was believed to solve the unemployment issue that the People’s Action Party (PAP) had inherited on accepting office⁶.

Crisis framing was also used to reinforce the case for smaller families at a time when birth rates “must be further reduced at all costs”. In the 70s, a headline reads: “Chua warns: Irresponsible parents may be penalised” (1972)⁷. Mr Chua Sian Chin, then Health Minister, shared at the 1972 Family Planning Campaign that there was a demographic who were producing “more children that they can afford to feed and bring up”, and therefore needed to be penalised. Later in 1975, Dr Toh Chin Chye, Health Minister, used data to encourage parents to support the push for 2-child families — reporting that “children from these large-size low-income families are not only under average height and weight but also have difficulties with learning (...), lowering the quality of life for the large-sized family …”⁸. By highlighting the adverse effects and impacts of a large-size family, the government turned personal family choices into a high-stakes duty to the country.

Beyond direct warnings, newspapers keep this sense of crisis alive by constantly focusing on statistical records. Media coverage frames almost every change in birth rates as an unprecedented milestone, making every shift feel like an ongoing emergency. Modern headlines routinely sound the alarm over new lows, by reporting that the fertility rate dropped to "a record low of 0.87" in 2026⁹, or "hit a historic low of 1.05 in 2022”¹⁰. This trait of reporting endless decline mirrors coverage from past decades, such as when a The Business Times article declared a "record low" in 2009 despite new government incentives¹¹.

The irony is that this obsession with breaking records used to serve the exact opposite goal. In 1968, headlines proudly celebrated "4,238 fewer babies - a S’pore record" as fewer births matched state goals at the time¹². Whether celebrating or mourning birth rates, the constant use of dramatic "record-breaking" language ensures that demographic changes are always treated as a major crisis.

The Baby and the Stork

Newspaper coverage surrounding national family planning has also constantly relied on one familiar symbol: the stork. Headline writers have reused this traditional image of childbirth across totally opposite government goals. In the 1970s, headlines used the trope to push for fewer births, such as "Keeping the stork at bay" (1972)¹³, "Plan to stop the stork" (1973)¹⁴, and "Taking Stork" (1974)¹⁵. Decades later, when the government reversed its stance to encourage larger families, headlines turned to the same motif with “More carrots, but the stork won’t be lured” (2015)¹⁶, or "Encouraging the stork amid Covid-19" (2021)¹⁷. This bringing back of such metaphors shows how such imageries are leaned on to make major government policies about personal family choices feel more friendly.

Who are we blaming?

“Women marry late and opt for fewer kids in past decade” is a headline of a Straits Times article in 1981, and is one that still applies today¹⁸. These sentiments are not new, and date back to the 70s. Some of the reasons cited were women’s attainment of higher education and greater participation in the workforce. It was noted in the same article that economically active women who generally had less time to care for their children had a smaller average family size of two children, in comparison to economically inactive women who had an average of three. However, while the two clauses in the headline are true individually and can be backed by data, much of these articles are simply that - data. Such headlines might imply that because women’s demographic decisions directly correlate with lower fertility rates, the responsibility or "onus" for fixing or causing the decline lies on women.

Interestingly, headlines surrounding TFR today involve broader considerations, with it being an outcome of two-party decisions, broader societal conditions, economic pressures such as housing costs or cost-of-living expenses, workplace culture, or government policy. Today, headlines sound more like “Flexi-work, fertility health part of holistic framework to encourage couples to have kids: Indranee” (2021)¹⁹ or “Singapore youth aware of falling fertility rate, study finds, but 40% in no rush to marry” (2026)²⁰. Because understanding the underlying causes of low TFR naturally dictates the scope of the solution, there is a growing acknowledgment that the burden of addressing falling birth rates cannot rest solely on individual choices. Instead, it demands a 'whole-of-society' effort that aligns state policy, workplace culture, and community infrastructure.

Not Just Another Workgroup

In true Singaporean fashion, a new workgroup had been announced in February 2026, to tackle Singapore’s falling fertility rate, and is set to release its findings by early 2027. The Marriage and Parenthood Reset Workgroup chaired by Indranee Rajah comprises eight political office holders from various ministries, that can widely engage and effect change via their associated ministries. The workgroup is said to mark “a shift away from earlier approaches that focused largely on policy measures such as increasing subsidies, Baby Bonus payouts and Child Development Account Support.”²¹ This time, a broad range of stakeholders will instead be mobilised - not just from various ministries, but also employers, religious organisations, and the wider community. What is different now, though, is that the workgroup is not starting from scratch, with years of dwindling fertility rate endeavours to learn from. The framing of a ‘Reset’ workgroup also suggests a re-examining and recalibrating the approaches taken by various predecessors who have tried to tackle this same issue over the course of Singaporean history.

This is, however, not the first workgroup tasked at tackling the falling birth rates. In 2000, a headline reported that a “High-level fertility panel (was) set up” consisting of an 11-member inter-ministry committee (represented by only one lone woman) will look into reasons for low fertility rate in Singapore and attitudes holding Singaporeans back from marriage and childbirth. This would be done through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with young Singaporeans to get a feel of their aspirations and problems²².

On top of these taskforces, the government has also brought together initiatives and committees such as Singapore Family Planning and Population Board (SFPPB) during Singapore’s early anti-natalist days, Social Development Unit (SDU) in 1984²³ to address the adjacent trend of delayed marriages, and National Population and Talent Division (NPTD), which is a strategy group under the Prime Minister’s Office to address population issues established in 2011²⁴. These past committees show that while the goal has shifted from stopping births to encouraging them, the government's taskforce approach remains the same. The success of this new ‘Reset’ will then depend on whether it truly breaks away from past narratives towards parenthood to fix the real structural pressures couples face today.

Conclusion

While state policy has transitioned from anti-natalist measures to a broad ‘whole-of-society' framework, media narratives have routinely leaned on crisis framing, gendered onus, and bureaucratic taskforces to manage demographic shifts. The Marriage and Parenthood Reset Group then offers an opportunity to break from these historical patterns. Reversing demographic decline then demands a fundamental transformation in public language, replacing existential panic with genuine, structural support for Singaporean families – beyond new subsidies or inter-ministry committees.